Bankruptcy Watch: SIMAD Holdings Bankruptcy and Cross-Border Camp Portfolio Restructuring
- Arun Singh
- 3 days ago
- 7 min read
SIMAD Holdings Bankruptcy Filing Overview
SIMAD Holdings Ltd., a British Virgin Islands holding company headquartered in Trumbull, Connecticut, and 60 affiliated debtors filed Chapter 11 protection on June 4 and June 5, 2026, in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey, under Case No. 26-16388. A separately administered but related DAMIS group filed the same day under Case No. 26-16439. The SIMAD Debtors reported consolidated estimated assets of $100 million to $500 million and liabilities of $500 million to $1 billion, while the broader Shabsels enterprise reportedly included roughly 80 real estate assets across camps, office, retail, multifamily, and hotel properties.
The SIMAD platform owns and operates one of the largest privately held for-profit summer camp networks in the United States. The portfolio comprises approximately 30 camps, including 22 overnight camps and 8 day camps, concentrated in the Northeast and include Camo Sternberg in New York, Camp Lavi in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maine, plus Blue Star Camps in North Carolina. One camp, Willow Lake Day Camp, is operated by the platform but sits outside the bankruptcy estate.
TRD reported that the filing was tied to a platform with roughly 50,000 to 100,000 creditors and that both David and Michael Shabsels also filed for personal bankruptcy.
Case Snapshot
SIMAD Holdings is not a single-property bankruptcy. It is a multi-entity operating and real estate platform built around a seasonal camp network, with an annual enrollment base of about 20,500 children, a seasonal workforce of roughly 4,300 part-time and peak employees, and about 342 full-time employees, including approximately 30 camp directors. Peak-season payroll runs about $10.2 million per month, with employee benefits of roughly $400,000 per month.
The company’s 2025 operating results showed growth, not collapse. Revenue rose to $165.4 million from $159.4 million in 2024, operating profit increased to $24.3 million from $22.0 million, and consolidated EBITDA climbed to $41.9 million from $37.7 million. SIMAD Holdings reported net profit of $8 million for 2024.
That operating profile matters because the filing was not driven by a failed summer season. It was driven by capital structure stress, cash-control risk, and governance disruption at the holding-company level.
Portfolio Overview
The camp portfolio is organized around a decentralized, camp-level operating model. Each camp retains its own management team, accounting functions, and long-standing local brand. The holding company generally preserved existing camp identities rather than rebranding the portfolio under a single corporate name. Historic properties in the system include Pine Forest Camp, which traces its origins to 1931, and Camp Wekeela, which dates to 1922.
The portfolio also uses a two-entity camp structure in many cases, with a LandCo holding the real estate and an OperatingCo running operations. Some camps include outside minority partners, while others have nominal interests held through the affiliated DAMIS group.
Thirteen camps were pledged to bondholders in the December 2025 financing, including Camp Achim, Chen-A-Wanda, Club Getaway, Country Roads Day Camp, Eagle’s Landing, Echo, Green Lane, Malka, Lavi, Meadowbrook, the SHMA Camps, Mohawk Day Camp, and Rolling Hills Day Camp.
The Backdrop: Roll-Up Growth Meets Cross-Border Financing
The Shabsels brothers began acquiring camps in 2006 and, over nearly two decades, assembled a portfolio built around established multi-generational institutions rather than a new branded platform. The same enterprise reportedly controlled about 80 real estate assets in total, with the camp portfolio supported by office, retail, multifamily, and hotel properties largely held through the separately administered DAMIS group.
The December 2025 Tel Aviv bond offering became the financing engine for the latest phase of that roll-up. SIMAD Holdings Ltd. issued Series A debentures with NIS 620 million, or approximately $211.6 million, of par value on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. The camp portfolio was appraised at $466.6 million in connection with the offering, with a projected 2025 cap rate of approximately 10.5 percent. Proceeds were earmarked in part for shareholder asset purchases and early repayment of loans tied to the Shabselses’ personal guarantees.
The platform’s operating results still appeared healthy before the filing. The issue was not immediate operating failure. The issue was that an apparently stable seasonal business was financed through a stack that included public bonds, bank debt, merchant cash advances, and personal guarantees, all while the structure remained cross-border and highly fragmented.
The Immediate Catalyst: Bond Default, Cash Transfer Dispute, and MCA Pressure
The proximate trigger was a late-May 2026 disclosure to the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. SIMAD said nearly $34 million, approximately NIS 100 million, had been transferred to corporations controlled by Michael and David Shabsels without board approval. The audit committee demanded the money be returned with 7 percent interest, and the brothers later said they could not repay it by month end.
The transfer dispute coincided with a missed May 31, 2026 interest payment on the Series A debentures. Bond prices dropped sharply, trading was suspended on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, and Midroog downgraded the issuer to default level. The CRO’s first-day declaration attributes the filing to the missed interest payment and merchant cash advance acceleration risk, while stating that the full circumstances remain under investigation.
That cash-control risk was not abstract. The deck summary shows more than $100 million in MCA loans from roughly 42 lenders, many with ACH access rights that could have created an enterprise-wide cash seizure cascade as the summer season approached. The debtor stated that it did not believe the MCA lenders held a perfected interest in camp cash through deposit account control agreements.
Key Dates and Events
Date | Event |
2006 | The Shabsels brothers begin acquiring camps and building the platform. |
December 2025 | SIMAD raises NIS 620 million in Tel Aviv debentures, secured by camp collateral. |
May 31, 2026 | The first interest payment on the Series A debentures is missed, triggering default pressure. |
June 4 to June 5, 2026 | SIMAD Holdings Ltd. and 60 affiliates file Chapter 11 in New Jersey, alongside a related DAMIS case. |
June 8, 2026 | Chief Judge Gravelle enters an interim order allowing limited cash use to fund payroll and open camps. |
June 10, 2026 | Reporting indicates the camps are expected to open for the summer despite the bankruptcy. |
June 17, 2026 | A subsequent hearing on the first-day motions is scheduled before Judge Gravelle. |
July 13, 2026 | The court schedules a final hearing on certain first-day motions. |
Structural Stress Points
The SIMAD Debtors’ working-capital model is highly seasonal. Deposits for a given summer are due the year before, while running one season costs tens of millions. The deck summary says prepaid enrollments are effectively performance obligations, not ordinary cash claims, and notes that the debtors did not seek authority to honor camper deposits or issue refunds in the first-day package.
That creates a distinctive exposure. If a camp fails to open or a season stalls midstream, prepaid tuition can convert into unsecured refund claims. The deck summary also notes that aggregate general unsecured claims were estimated at about $2.7 million, far below the value of roughly 20,500 prepaid enrollments.
The secured stack is equally fragmented. The debtors disclosed a $214 million Series A bond claim held by Mishmeret Trust, about $29 million in Bank of New Hampshire loans, about $22 million in Wayne Bank loans, about $20 million in Fidelity Bank debt, about $18 million at Visions Credit Union, about $15 million in Newtek and NBL SPV II debt, about $25.4 million outstanding to Metropolitan Partners, and a more than $100 million MCA book. Smaller secured loans from HomeTrust Bank, Community Bank, Putnam County Savings Bank, Bank of America, SBA EIDL programs, HT Northstar, and Mizzen Capital add more layers to the stack.
None of these features is unusual on its own. Together, they created a structure where one missed bond coupon and one season of cash disruption could ripple across a large operating platform.
Why the Entity Structure Matters
This case is defined by structure. SIMAD is a BVI parent with U.S. operating assets, public debt in Tel Aviv, and a separate but related DAMIS case filing alongside it. The bond trustee, Mishmeret, coordinated with the debtors on the filing, and the first-day relief was built around one objective, opening the 2026 season on time.
The camp network itself is built on layered entities, parallel LandCo and OperatingCo structures, and a mix of internal and outside ownership stakes. That structure can help preserve legacy brands and local management, but it also makes cash governance more delicate when the platform is under stress.
The estate’s causes of action may also matter. The deck summary flags potential avoidance or fraudulent transfer claims tied to the $34 million transfer, MCA preference exposure, fiduciary duty claims, double pledge issues, and possible veil piercing or substantive consolidation theories involving DAMIS. The filing is structured as a plenary Chapter 11 in New Jersey, not an Israeli or BVI process, which gives the U.S. court direct control over the operating cash and the camp real estate.
These elements do not eliminate market risk. But they preserve optionality, slow escalation, and create earlier intervention opportunities.
A Broader Pattern Camp Operators Should Note
This case reflects a broader pattern in seasonal operating businesses that are capitalized like financial assets. The operating platform can look healthy on revenue, profit, and EBITDA, but the structure can still fail if governance breaks, a bond coupon is missed, and short-term cash access is too easy for one creditor to seize.
Increasingly, outcomes are shaped less by whether the underlying business is viable and more by whether the capital stack can survive a timing shock. In SIMAD’s case, the crisis was not a collapsing camp season. It was a financing stack that lost its footing just as the summer season needed to open.
Final Thought:
A profitable operating platform can still become a restructuring case when cash control, governance, and seasonality break in the same window.
Building Resilient Structures
At SPE Specialists, we analyze cases like SIMAD Holdings to understand how capital structure, governance, and entity design shape outcomes in operating platforms with seasonal cash flow. Thoughtful SPE structuring, independent oversight, and disciplined financing frameworks can support earlier intervention when a business’s operating strength is no longer enough to offset a fragile capital stack.
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